

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Carlos Hernandez Greene, #291622 (aka James Bernard Grant);)	C/A No. 6:06-1311-CMC-WMC
)	
)	
Plaintiff;)	
)	
vs.)	Report and Recommendation
)	
South Carolina Department of Corrections; South Carolina Department of Probation and Parole)	
and Pardons; Ms. Sherry Moses; Ms. Doris Mixon;)	
and Ms. Michelle Gregg,)	
)	
Defendants.)	
)	

The Plaintiff, Carlos Greene (hereafter, the "Plaintiff") is a state prisoner proceeding *pro se*. He appears to seek relief pursuant to Title 42 United States Code §1983. Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in prisoner cases filed under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff complains that the defendants have improperly calculated his sentence and he seeks monetary damages. In *State v. Grant (aka, Carlos Greene)*, 2001-GS-10-1147, Plaintiff was convicted of burglary in the Charleston County Court of General Sessions. On March 22, 2001, he was sentenced to five (5) years imprisonment, suspended upon serving eight (8) months followed by two (2) years probation.

As attachments to his Complaint, Plaintiff filed copies of three subsequent commitment orders reflecting probation violations. In June 2001, he was arrested but

allowed to remain on probation apparently to receive medical treatment. In November 2001 he was arrested for violating four conditions of his probation. Plaintiff was returned to Charleston County Detention Center (CCDC) to await placement at a Community Control Center. Finally, on May 22, 2003, Plaintiff's probation was revoked and the original five year sentence was imposed. The commitment order granted him credit for his original eight months plus 216 days. He had been arrested in May 2002.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff is a *pro se* litigant, and thus his pleadings are accorded liberal construction. *Hughes v. Rowe*, 449 U.S. 5 (1980); *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); *Loe v. Armistead*, 582 F. 2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1978); *Gordon v. Leeke*, 574 F. 2d 1147 (4th Cir. 1978). *Pro se* pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. *Hughes v. Rowe*, *supra*. Even under this less stringent standard, however, this *pro se* Complaint is still subject to summary dismissal. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. *Weller v. Dep't of Social Services*, 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

§ 1983 ACTION HAS NOT ACCRUED

As a matter of law, Plaintiff cannot bring an action under 42 U.S.C. §1983 until his conviction has been vacated or expunged. The United States Supreme Court, in *Heck v. Humphrey*, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), explained the rule that claims of the type here presented must await the vacation or expungement of the underlying conviction:

We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or

sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

512 U.S. at 486-487 (footnotes omitted).

Whether or not an incorrect sentence calculation has occurred, Plaintiff's incarceration at this point in time remains a valid conviction precluding any recovery of monetary damages under Plaintiff's theory. *Heck* compels dismissal of this action, albeit without prejudice.

CONCLUSION

The Defendants should not be required to answer this Complaint. It is therefore recommended that the within Complaint be dismissed without prejudice and without issuance or service of process. Plaintiff's attention is directed to the Notice on the following page.

s/William M. Catoe
United States Magistrate Judge

August 1, 2006
Greenville, South Carolina

**Notice of Right to File Objections to Magistrate Judge's "Report and Recommendation"
& The Serious Consequences of a Failure to Do So**

The petitioner is hereby notified that any objections to the attached Report and Recommendation must be filed within **ten (10) days** of the date of its filing. 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The time calculation of this ten-day period excludes weekends and holidays and provides for an additional three days for filing by mail. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. Based thereon, this Report and Recommendation, any objections thereto, and the case file will be **delivered to a United States District Judge** fourteen (14) days after this Report and Recommendation is filed. A magistrate judge makes only a recommendation, and the authority to make a final determination in this case rests with the United States District Judge. See *Mathews v. Weber*, 423 U.S. 261, 270-271 (1976).

During the ten-day period, but not thereafter, a party must file with the Clerk of Court specific, written objections to the Report and Recommendation, if he or she wishes the United States District Judge to consider any objections. **Any written objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections.** See *Keeler v. Pea*, 782 F. Supp. 42, 43-44 (D.S.C. 1992). Failure to file specific, written objections shall constitute a waiver of a party's right to further judicial review, including appellate review, if the recommendation is accepted by the United States District Judge. See *United States v. Schronce*, 727 F.2d 91, 94 & n. 4 (4th Cir.); and *Wright v. Collins*, 766 F.2d 841, 845-847 & nn. 1-3 (4th Cir. 1985). Moreover, if a party files specific objections to a portion of a magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation, but does not file specific objections to other portions of the Report and Recommendation, that party waives appellate review of the portions of the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation to which he or she did not object. In other words, a party's failure to object to one issue in a magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation precludes that party from subsequently raising that issue on appeal, even if objections are filed on other issues. *Howard v. Secretary of HHS*, 932 F.2d 505, 508-509 (6th Cir. 1991). See also *Praylow v. Martin*, 761 F.2d 179, 180 n. 1 (4th Cir.)(party precluded from raising on appeal factual issue to which it did not object in the district court). In *Howard*, *supra*, the Court stated that general, non-specific objections are *not* sufficient:

A general objection to the entirety of the [magistrate judge's] report has the same effects as would a failure to object. The district court's attention is not focused on any specific issues for review, thereby making the initial reference to the [magistrate judge] useless. * This duplication of time and effort wastes judicial resources rather than saving them, and runs contrary to the purposes of the Magistrates Act. *** We would hardly countenance an appellant's brief simply objecting to the district court's determination without explaining the source of the error.**

Accord *Lockert v. Faulkner*, 843 F.2d 1015, 1017-1019 (7th Cir. 1988), where the Court held that the appellant, who proceeded *pro se* in the district court, was barred from raising issues on appeal that he did not specifically raise in his objections to the district court:

Just as a complaint stating only 'I complain' states no claim, an objection stating only 'I object' preserves no issue for review. * A district judge should not have to guess what arguments an objecting party depends on when reviewing a [magistrate judge's] report.**

See also *Branch v. Martin*, 886 F.2d 1043, 1046 (8th Cir. 1989)(*"no de novo review if objections are untimely or general"*), which involved a *pro se* litigant; and *Goney v. Clark*, 749 F.2d 5, 7 n. 1 (3rd Cir. 1984)(*"plaintiff's objections lacked the specificity to trigger de novo review"*).

This notice apprises the petitioner of the consequences of a failure to file specific, written objections. See *Wright v. Collins*, *supra*; and *Small v. Secretary of HHS*, 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2nd Cir. 1989). Filing by mail pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections addressed as follows:

**Larry W. Propes, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 10768
Greenville, South Carolina 29603**